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Abstract  
India’s Muslim community, which accounts for 14.4 percent of India’s vast population 
and is thus the largest of all religious minorities, has been the subject of considerable 
development discourse as Muslims have the lowest level of educational attainment and 
standard of living among socio-religious groups in the country. This study addresses the 
meaning of education and career opportunities for Muslim youths in relation to their 
educational credentials and social position in the hierarchy of Muslim class and caste 
groups, with particular reference to a community in Uttar Pradesh. The author contends 
that the career opportunities, possibilities, and strategies of Muslim youths in Indian 
society depend on multiple factors: social hierarchy, opportunities to utilize economic 
resources, social networks, cultural capital, and the wider structural disparities within 
which the Muslims are situated and wherein they question the value of higher education 
in gaining them admission to socially recognized and established employment sectors. 
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Abstract 
India’s Muslim community, which accounts for 14.4 percent of India’s vast 
population and is thus the largest of all religious minorities, has been the subject of 
considerable development discourse as Muslims have the lowest level of educational 
attainment and standard of living among socio-religious groups in the country. This 
study addresses the meaning of education and career opportunities for Muslim youths in 
relation to their educational credentials and social position in the hierarchy of Muslim 
class and caste groups, with particular reference to a community in Uttar Pradesh. The 
author contends that the career opportunities, possibilities, and strategies of Muslim 
youths in Indian society depend on multiple factors: social hierarchy, opportunities to 
utilize economic resources, social networks, cultural capital, and the wider structural 
disparities within which the Muslims are situated and wherein they question the value 
of higher education in gaining them admission to socially recognized and established 
employment sectors. 
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1 Introduction 
 
India has been witnessing a twin paradox. On the one hand, rapid economic growth—
over six percent GDP growth since the 1980s (IHD, 2014, p. 1)—has given the country 
a heightened status in the global economy. On the other hand, the benefits of economic 
development have not improved the quality of life for a vast number of socio-religious 
groups largely conditioned by structurally and historically defined exploitative contexts. 
Due to the persistent conditions of structural disparity and social inequality, this 
economic development boom cannot generate the desired social change and class 
mobility at an equal rate for all social classes, caste groups, and religious minorities. At 
the heart of this paradox, the Muslim community—which accounts for 14.4 percent of 
India’s vast population, making it the largest of all religious minorities in India—has 
been the subject of considerable development discourse, for it has the lowest levels of 
educational attainment when compared with major socio-religious groups in India and 
the lowest standard of living in the country (see Ghosh, 2013). Research indicates that 
Muslims, on average, spend 32.7 rupees per day, whereas Sikhs spend 55.3, Christians 
51.4, and Hindus 37.5 rupees (Ghosh, 2013). Muslims’ heavy concentration in low-
paying jobs—mostly self-employed, casual labor, and artisanal sectors—affects their 
low contribution to the country’s overall GDP growth. Their overall contribution to the 
country’s GDP, 11.2 percent, is lower than that of the Dalits and Adivasi (indigenous 
groups defined as Scheduled Tribes or ST), at 16.5 percent (Times of India, 2013). 
Despite various government measures aimed at transforming Muslims’ social and 
economic conditions, the plight of the largest religious minority community in India 
remains notably unchanged. 
 This study addresses the meaning of Muslim youths’ education and career 
opportunities in relation to their educational credentials and social position in the 
hierarchy of Muslim class and caste groups, with particular reference to a community in 
Uttar Pradesh. The author contends that the career opportunities, possibilities, and 
strategies of Muslim youths in Indian society depend on multiple factors: social 
hierarchy, opportunities to utilize economic resources, social networks, cultural capital, 
and the wider structural disparities in which the Muslims are situated and in which they 
perceive their social and political status. The study is based on several phases of 
fieldwork in Salai village of Hapur, a newly founded district located in western Uttar 
Pradesh, about 60 kilometers east of New Delhi, which was previously known as a sub-
 2 
district of the Ghaziabad district from 2012 to 2016. It uses both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses to delineate how the Muslim community’s perceived notions about 
the benefits of education—shaped by everyday life practices, competition for social and 
economic mobility with other classes and caste groups, and exposure to the wider social 
context in Indian society—affect school participation and preferences as well as school-
to-work transitions among Muslim youths. 
 The study is organized as follows. In section 2, the author locates the scholarly 
discourse and debate over Indian Muslims’ socioeconomic backwardness in relation to 
wider social and political contexts in India. Before delineating the nature of the Muslim 
community that the author has examined, an overview of Muslim demographic 
distribution, education, and employment trends in India will be provided (sections 3 and 
4). Then, in sections 5 and 6, a description of the social, economic, and cultural lives of 
the Muslim community in the research area shall be given. The author seeks to identify 
the factors that have profound, albeit not deterministic, impact in explaining why 
Muslim youths tend to have less aspiration toward higher education and greater focus 
on finding career opportunities both during and after secondary education, mainly 
within the defined spaces of Muslims’ primary employment: self-employment, artisan 
work, and casual labor. The penultimate section considers the linkage between 
education and employment by analyzing several cases of Muslim youths from Salai. 
The conclusion summarizes the findings and suggests broader implications regarding 
the relationship between education and employment trends, taking into account existing 
structural and social inequalities and the impediments they pose to social changes 
among youths from underprivileged classes, castes, and religious minorities. 
 
 
2 Social Change among Indian Muslims: Discourse and Debate 
 
The dearth of scholarship and robust empirical evidence on how social, political, and 
cultural forces interact in such a way as to restrict social change and sustain the status 
quo has compelled researchers to depend on tabulated numerical representations of the 
Muslim community in India. Widely held public perceptions often pinpoint religious 
and cultural conservatism as causal factors of the Muslim community’s backwardness. 
However, recent scholarship and several government reports suggest that the interplay 
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of political, cultural, social, and economic forces continues to produce and reproduce 
the differences between Muslims and other social and religious communities (hereafter 
SRCs) in India (see GOI, 2006; Das, 2008), thereby challenging the broader public 
perception that tends to blame the Muslim community for its own poverty. The Sachhar 
Committee Report, a widely circulated and much-quoted study by a government 
commission, captures multifaceted factors associated with the political, cultural, and 
social problems that Muslims face in everyday life (GOI, 2006; Basant, 2007). Although 
many of these factors are also equally applicable to other backward SRCs, what 
distinguishes the Muslims from other groups is a political and cultural sense of 
alienation from mainstream Indian society. Historically defined political conditions, 
sensitivity to communalism in political campaigns and discourses, and the construction 
of Indian nationalism in close connection to the notions of “Hindu” land poses a serious 
political question to Muslims: “Can a Muslim be Indian?” (Pandey, 1999). In this 
political condition, “Muslims carry a double burden of being labeled as “anti-national” 
and as being “appeased” at the same time” (GOI, 2006, p. 11). Issues of insecurity and 
vulnerability push many Muslims to live in a particular location, and therefore Muslim 
“ghettoization” is markedly visible in housing, schooling, and jobs (GOI, 2006, p. 14; 
Basant, 2007, p. 828). Low representation in public and private regular employment 
sectors, collective alienation, perceptions of discrimination in government employment, 
lack of security, and suspicion of Muslims among state apparatuses and agencies tend to 
reproduce this process of ghettoization, causing Muslims to attach less importance to 
formal secular education and preventing them from translating their education into 
respectable and desirable jobs. Moreover, many Muslims find that making the effort to 
learn Urdu, a marker of their cultural and religious tradition, presents another limitation 
within the context of school textbooks and communities that use a different language 
(GOI, 2006, pp. 14–15; Basant, 2007, pp. 828–829). 
Research evidence suggests that despite structural constraints, Muslims and 
other backward classes have responded to the processes of economic and social change 
in which education is a significant factor (Jeffrey, Jeffery, and Jeffery, 2004). In north 
India, and especially in Uttar Pradesh, not only educated Muslims but also other 
disadvantaged groups have failed to secure salaried employment and “respectable jobs,” 
which often refers to government jobs, and in this context, pursuing further education is 
not seen as leading to a position of economic security. Increasing educational 
participation and attainment creates social frustration among educated but still 
unemployed youths in the wake of unhealthy and unfair competition in the formal 
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employment sectors, which is closely linked to the rise of political activism among the 
historically defined lower social classes and occupational groups such as Dalits (Jeffrey 
et al., 2004; Jeffrey, Jeffery, and Jeffery, 2008a; Jeffrey, 2010). Educational credentials 
cannot bring about a significant social change among the lower classes, including 
Muslims, and the exploitative relationship between the upper and lower classes remains 
structurally unchanged. Moreover, schooling continues to reproduce class and caste 
differences, and the youths in underprivileged social groups lack social networks and 
cultural capital despite their improved education, thereby inhibiting their ability to 
compete with upper-class and elite youths (see Jeffrey et al., 2004; Jeffrey, Jeffery, and 
Jeffery, 2005). Compared to the Dalits, Muslims have a greater tendency to depend on 
local wage labor and artisanal work, which pay low salaries and have been less 
successful in obtaining educational credentials and securing regular salaried jobs 
(Jeffrey et al., 2005, p. 2090). Unlike Dalit youths, Muslim youths are less visible in 
wider Indian society when translating their social frustration into political activism. 
What distinguishes Muslims from Dalits is that, when pushed out from formal and 
regular jobs, they tend to form a “minority enclave labor market” characterized by self-
employment, casual labor, and low-paying local artisanal work (Das, 2008). This pattern, 
resulting from lack of land ownership, higher educational credentials, social networks, 
and cultural capital, continues to reproduce ghettoization and the differences between 
Muslims and other social classes. 
 
 
3 Muslims’ Demography in India: Myths and Reality 
 
The partitioning of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 had an enormous effect in 
reconfiguring the demographic distribution of its two major religious communities, 
Hindus and Muslims (Visaria, 1969). The Muslim population in India is spatially 
distributed across different regions and districts. They represent a majority in 
Lakshwadweep, Jammu, and Kashmir. Among India’s 30 states, there are six where the 
Muslim population is above the national average. In terms of raw numbers, Uttar 
Pradesh has the most Muslims, with more than 30 million; followed by West Bengal, 
with more than 20 million; Bihar, with more than 13 million; and Maharashtra, which 
has more than 10 million Muslim inhabitants (MoHRD, 2013, p. 3). 
 As shown in Table 1, the Muslim population in India was 47 million (more than 
10 percent of the total population) in 1961 and rose to 138 million (more than 13 
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percent of the total) in 2001. On the other hand, the Hindus, the largest religious group, 
accounted for 83.5 percent of India’s total population in 1961, but their share fell to 80.5 
percent in 2001 (GOI, 2006, pp. 28–29). The 2011 census placed India’s total 
population at 1.21 billion (COI, 2014), with Muslims representing 14.2 percent. 
 
Table 1: Population Distribution of Muslim and Other Major Religious Groups in India, 
1961–2001 
Year Religious Groups (Population in millions) 
All Hindu Muslim Christ. Sikh Buddhist Jain Other 
1961 439.23 
(100) 
366.53 
(83.45) 
46.94 
(10.69) 
10.73 
(2.44) 
7.85 
(1.79) 
3.26 
(0.74) 
2.03 
(0.46) 
1.91 
(0.43) 
1971 547.95 
(100) 
453.29 
(82.73) 
61.42 
(11.21) 
14.22 
(2.6) 
10.38 
(1.89) 
3.91 
(0.70) 
2.61 
(0.48) 
2.22 
(0.41) 
1981 683.33 
(100) 
562.39 
(82.3) 
80.29 
(11.75) 
16.70 
(2.44) 
13.09 
(1.92) 
4.76 
(0.70) 
3.22 
(0.47) 
2.89 
(0.42) 
1991 846.39 
(100) 
690.06 
(81.53) 
106.72 
(12.61) 
19.65 
(2.32) 
16.43 
(1.94) 
6.48 
(0.77) 
3.36 
(0.40) 
3.70 
(0.44) 
2001 1028.61 
(100) 
827.58 
(80.46) 
138.19 
(13.43) 
24.08 
(2.34) 
19.22 
(1.87) 
7.96 
(0.77) 
4.23 
(0.41) 
7.37 
(0.72) 
2011 1210.19 
(100) 
966.3 
(79.8) 
172.2 
(14.2) 
27.8 
(2.3) 
20.8 
(1.7) 
8.4 
(0.7) 
4.5 
(0.4) 
7.9 
(0.7) 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the percentage of the population. 
Sources: GOI, 2006, p. 271; The Hindu, August 25, 2015. 
 
The difference between Muslims and Hindus in terms of fertility and population 
growth rate tends to feed powerful perceptions about Muslims in India. First, Muslim 
religious conservatism is seen as explaining the community’s high population growth 
rate, since Muslims are widely perceived as not engaging in the use of contraception. 
Second, it is assumed that, due to their insecure minority status, the Muslims are 
deliberately seeking to increase their numerical strength over against the predominant 
Hindu majority. Contrary to such perceptions, however, studies show that many 
Muslims are willing to regulate their fertility, although the rate of family planning 
remains 10 percent lower than the national average (Basant, 2007, p. 829) and the 
overall Muslim population’s growth has been slowed by declining fertility trends. The 
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myth about Muslims’ out-of-control population growth relative to that of the Hindu 
majority is often perpetuated by Hindu nationalist discourse and propaganda (Jeffery 
and Jeffery, 2002). Micro-level research findings challenge this myth, which is based on 
“dangerous propaganda in the victimization of minority groups” and is often used to 
“justify demonizing Muslims” (Jeffery and Jeffery, 2002, p. 1816). The 2011 census 
shows that although the Muslim population is still growing faster than the Hindu 
population, its growth rate has slowed more sharply than the Hindu growth rate 
throughout the preceding decade, reducing the difference between the two communities 
(The Hindu, August 25, 2015). This decline in the growth rate can be attributed to the 
Muslim community’s increasing educational attainment and awareness of the burden of 
raising children in a competitive social world in India.  
  
 
4 Education among Indian Muslims 
 
The Indian constitution guarantees “free and compulsory” education for all children 
aged six to 14. Despite such constitutional protection, inequities in education across 
various social, ethnic, and religious minority groups persist. Muslims’ educational 
attainment and performance are far behind the Hindu community and, in many cases, 
even lower than other disadvantaged social and minority groups such as Scheduled 
Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC). As shown in 
Table 2, Muslims have the lowest literacy rate among all major religious communities in 
India. 
 
Table 2: Literacy Rate among Muslims and Other Major Religious Communities in 
India, 2001 
Religious Groups Literacy Rate 
Male Female Total 
Hindus 76.2 53.2 65.1 
Muslims 67.6 50.1 59.1 
Christians 84.4 76.2 80.3 
Sikhs 75.2 63.1 69.4 
Buddhists 83.1 61.7 72.7 
Sources: MoHR (2013, p. 4); COI (2011, p. 3). 
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The government has reported that the mean year of educational attainment 
among Muslim children is the lowest of all socio-religious groups. According to a report, 
one-fourth of Muslim children in the 6–14 age group either never attended school or 
dropped out of school education (GOI 2006, p. 58). Among Muslims aged 17 and above, 
only 17 percent have attained matriculation, as opposed to the national average of 26 
percent. Their educational participation gradually decreases at higher levels of 
education, and the gap between Muslims and other socio-religious groups increases. 
Only 50 percent of Muslim children who complete middle school are likely to continue 
into secondary school, while the national average is 62 percent. Seven percent of the 
Indian population aged 20 and above are secondary school graduates; for Muslims this 
proportion is just four percent (GOI, 2006, p. 58). 
 
Figure 1: Change in Educational Attainment among Muslims (Age 17–29) and Other 
SRCs in India, 1999–2000 to 2009–2010 
 
Source: Data used here is taken from Basant (2012, p. 12) 
 
Despite having a lower level of educational attainment than other SRCs, 
Muslim OBC
Muslim General
Muslim All
Muslim OBC
Muslim General
Muslim All
19
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-0
0
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0
33.7% 
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18.8% 
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5.8% 
10.2% 
9.7% 
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2.7% 
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Change in Education Trend among Muslims in India, 
1999-2000 to 2009-2010 
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Muslims have exhibited increasing educational aspirations in recent years (Figure 1). In 
the school year 1999–2000, 36 percent of Muslims aged 17–29 were illiterate; that 
figure had dropped to 22.3 percent in 2009–2010. The Muslim participation in 
secondary education and below rose from 55.5 to 63.8 percent in that decade, while it 
increased from 5.8 to 9.8 percent in secondary education and from 2.7 to 4.1 percent at 
the postsecondary level during the same time period (Basant, 2012, p. 12) (Table 3 in 
Annex and Figure 1).  
However, when compared with other SRCs, Muslim educational attainment still 
lags behind. For instance, in the same decade, Hindu upper castes’ educational 
participation at the postsecondary level increased by more than seven percentage points 
(from 12 to 19.2 percent), that of Hindu OBCs by nearly five percentage points (from 
3.6 to 8.5 percent), and that of Muslims by much less (from 2.7 to 4.1 percent) (Table 3 
in Annex). This suggests that Muslims’ aspiration to higher education is relatively 
stagnant. As noted earlier, many Muslims do not necessarily translate higher educational 
credentials into jobs, and the negative correlation between education and career 
opportunities continues to dominate the nature of Muslim education in India. 
 Indian Muslims’ educational backwardness is often attributed to their preference 
for Islamic religious education or madrasas. It is widely believed that madrasa education 
contributes to the maintenance of Muslim culture and Islamic tradition and is less 
applicable to and effective for India’s development paradigm. In many areas where 
mainstream schools are unavailable or have an insufficient capacity, madrasas founded 
by volunteer community initiatives are the only sources of schooling for many Muslim 
children. These institutions, often with philanthropic support from and close ties to the 
community, educate many children voluntarily, though such education cannot guarantee 
economic opportunity. In recent years, the government has started to engage with 
madrasas in an effort to strengthen their role in promoting overall educational 
attainment in India. 
Unlike in other parts of South Asia, madrasas in India have been protected under 
“minority rights” as enshrined by Article 30(1) of the Constitution: “All minorities… 
shall have the right to establish and administer education institutions of their own.” The 
Muslim leadership, and the clergy in particular, use this constitutional right to protect 
the madrasa system from state intervention. The state’s initiatives for modernizing 
madrasas, though welcomed by many Muslims, have not been as successful as hoped. 
The religious leaders oppose madrasa reform, and their opposition is often endorsed by 
the Muslim community, which feels a sense of ownership of the madrasas since these 
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institutions are culturally, religiously, and linguistically more connected to their lives 
compared to mainstream schools, from which their culture and traditions are absent 
regarding both school curriculum and ethos.  
Recent state reform schemes have not been forcibly imposed; rather, they 
encourage voluntary participation by madrasas to include general curriculum subjects, 
become affiliated with an education board or institute, and have teachers for non-
religious subjects so that their schools can be deemed equivalent to mainstream schools. 
In 2009, the government created a “Central Madrasa Education Board,” although it still 
exists only on paper and not in reality. The National Commission for Minority 
Educational Institutions (NCMEI) was founded in 2004 to issue minority status 
certificates to educational institutions, including madrasas. Once a madrasa receives this 
certificate, it would be protected as a minority institution and would be eligible to 
receive certain government benefits. To further attract madrasas to incorporate 
mainstream education, the Ministry of Human Resource Development of the central 
government introduced the Scheme for Providing Quality Education in madrasas. Under 
this project, eligible madrasas are provided with general subject teachers and these 
teachers’ salaries, as well as with funding for libraries, computer labs, and building 
construction. During this research, the author found that many schools and small-scale 
madrasas that had become affiliated with the state madrasa education board were 
receiving the central government’s financial benefits, whereas the more established, 
traditional madrasas are unwilling to receive these incentives. To qualify for this support, 
each madrasa must complete a series of bureaucratic tasks, and in many cases, the 
benefits do not reach the madrasa on a regular basis. 
 
Table 4: Number of Madrasas and Enrollment of Muslim Children in India, 2011–2012 
Type of Madrasas Number of 
Madrasas 
Enrollment 
Boys Girls Total 
Recognized 5,797 951,267 1,034,725 1,985,992 
Unrecognized 2,392 259,616 229,942 489,558 
Total 8,189 1,210,883 1,264,667 2,475,550 
Source: MoHRD (2013, p. 17) 
 
 According to the District Information System for Education, nearly 2.5 million 
Muslim children were enrolled in more than 8,000 madrasas in the country from 2011–
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2012 (Table 4). It is widely perceived that Muslims are inclined to prefer madrasa 
education, but such claims lack empirical evidence. A government report in 2006 
reported that only three percent of school-going Muslim children attended madrasas 
(GOI, 2006, p. 77). Another recent report suggests that the number of Muslim children 
enrolled in madrasas constitutes 9.7 percent of all enrolled Muslim children (MoHRD, 
2013, p. 17). 
 
 
5 Class, Economy, and Social Inequality in Salai, Uttar Pradesh 
 
This research was conducted in a Muslim-dominated village in the Hapur district of 
Uttar Pradesh. Hapur, a sub-district of Ghaziabad as enumerated in the 2011 census, was 
made a separate district administration in 2011 by Mayawati, then the Chief Minister of 
Uttar Pradesh. The city is located in western Uttar Pradesh, 60 km east of New Delhi 
(figure 2). According to the 2011 Census Report, the entire city population is more than 
2.6 million, and the average literacy rate is 74.03 percent, almost identical to the 
national literacy rate (74.04 percent). The gender disparity in literacy rates is also 
comparable to national data. The male literacy rate in Hapur, as in India overall, is 
higher than 80 percent, whereas the female literacy rate is 66.59 percent, slightly higher 
than the national average of 65.46 percent (COI, 2015a, 2015b). The population of 
Hapur is composed of various SRCs, and the concentration of Muslim population is 
relatively higher in the city, at 32.12 percent, while the majority Hindus represents 
66.27 percent (COI, 2015b). The city is on a highway between Delhi and Lucknow, the 
capital of the state of Uttar Pradesh. The city is also connected to Noida, an abbreviated 
name for the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, a planned city of the 
National Capital Region of India (figure 2). 
Salai is one of the 331 inhabited villages of the district and is roughly seven km 
away from Hapur city. The villagers frequently commute to the city using light horse-
drawn carriages, locally known as buggi, or a jugaad, a vehicle crafted locally 
combining a wooden frame and agricultural water pump engine. Salai is divided into 
eight mohalla or clusters of households, and usually in each mohalla, Muslims of the 
same occupational group live together. In the village, Muslims are predominant in 
number, with a few Hindu families, mostly SC, also living there. The village had a 
population of 8,131 from 1,304 families as of the 2011 census. Of these, 87 or 1.07 
percent families were enumerated as SC, and no ST families were identified. Data on 
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OBC families have not yet been released. The literacy rate in the village was 63.73 
percent, much lower than the national average. A high gender disparity in education is 
also present, as the female literacy rate (51.81 percent) is 23 percent lower than that for 
males (75.01 percent). The literacy rate in the village is lower than the average for Uttar 
Pradesh (67.68 percent). Among the village population, 1,859 people (all but 119 of 
them male) were identified as employed; among these, 92.63 percent were main 
workers—i.e., those who had been engaged in gainful employment for at least six 
months. Of the main workers, 441 were cultivators and 352 were agricultural laborers 
(COI, 2015c). 
 
Figure 2: The Research Area, Salai Village, Hapur, Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Muslims in Salai village are socially stratified into a complicated system of 
hierarchy characterized by the practice of endogamy, occupational specialization on a 
Salai, Hapur 
Delhi 
Noida 
Source: d-maps.com 
URL: http://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=24855&lang=en 
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largely hereditary basis and status-based social relationships. The social structure has 
essential similarities to the Hindu caste structure but is not identical with regard to the 
notion of ritual purity and impurity, which forms the basis of Hindu caste hierarchy. The 
Muslim caste system, known as biradari (from the Persian term for brotherhood), is 
widely observed in Salai. The Muslim families with Tyagi and Rajput surnames define 
themselves as Chowdhury and are at the top of the hierarchy of the village’s biradari 
system. The Chowdhury biradari contains cultivators and landowners, although only a 
few families own land in the village. According to the categorization of SRCs in India, 
Chowdhury families fall into the “Muslim General” group and are not entitled to any 
privileges under India’s affirmative action policy, such as reservation policy.  
In the biradari system in Salai, several other groups are distinguishable by their 
hereditary occupation, these include: Ansari/Jhulaha (hereditary occupation: clothes 
weaving or tailoring); Dhobi (clothes washer); Teli/Malik (oil producer/maker); Saqqa-
Bhisti (water provider); Nai (hair cutter); Saifi/Lohar (carpentry, ironsmithing); and 
Fakir/Alvi/Mian (ascetic beggar). The family names reflect the hereditary occupational 
group and social position, and many of the family titles used by the Muslims are also 
shared among Hindus. It is believed that the Muslim families who share the same family 
title with Hindus converted to Islam from Hinduism at some point. Unlike the Muslim 
Chowdhury, all of these families fall into the category of “Muslim OBC,” although 
there are also certain hierarchical differences within these OBC Muslim families. On the 
other hand, despite the dominant presence of Muslims, a handful of Hindu families 
living in the village are from the Parjapati and Balmiki, two sub-caste groups of Dalits. 
The Panchayet, the village administrative system, is always headed by a Muslim 
(known as Pradhan), and the representation from the Hindu community remains 
nominal, consistent with their minimal presence in the village.  
Although the Muslim community in Salai village is stratified according to 
historically defined hereditary occupational specializations, not all the families continue 
to uphold their historical occupation. For instance, among the Chowdhury households, 
few are land tenants who depend on the farming economy; most of these families 
engage in various kinds of non-farming employment, including casual labor. Similarly, 
most of the Muslim OBC families’ occupations are dispersed, not limited to their 
hereditary specialization, except for some families from the Nai and Dorji caste groups. 
The distribution of occupations relative to the Muslims’ caste statuses is varied and 
often overlapping across the Muslim families within the village. Despite their higher 
status in the Muslims’ biradari system, youths and adults in many Chowdhury families 
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engage in manual and casual labor alongside the youths and parents of OBC families.  
However, farming activities are largely handled by few Chowdhury families due 
to their ownership of cultivable lands, and members of other groups usually work as 
daily wage laborers in the farmlands, especially during the harvest and cultivation 
seasons. At the same time, landless Chowdhury families may also depend on such 
seasonal agricultural labor for employment. To avoid the fragmentation of land 
ownership, many prefer to keep the family undivided, and if the family has multiple 
wage-earning members, some may engage in farming while others carry out various 
other kinds of income-generating activities. 
 
Table 5: Distribution of Households (HH) by Land Ownership and Social Category in 
Salai, Uttar Pradesh  
 
HH No. Landless < 5 
Bigha 
5–10 
Bigha 
10–20 Bigha 
 
20–30 
Bigha 
 
Over 30 
Bigha 
 Muslim General 
36 10 7 5 5 4 5 
100% 28% 
 
19% 
 
14% 
 
14% 
 
11% 
 
14% 
 Muslim OBC 
34 34 0 0 0 0 0 
100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
All Muslims 
70 44 7 5 5 4 5 
100% 63% 10% 7% 7% 6% 7% 
Note: 1 Bigha = 0.637 acres 
Source: Field surveys 2012–2013, 2014–2015 
 
Of the 70 households surveyed—36 Muslim General (i.e. those Chowdhury 
families who use Tyagi and Rajput as their family names) and 34 Muslim OBC 
families—63 percent are landless and another 10 percent have less than five Bigha of 
land (one Bigha = 0.637 acres). Only 13 percent families have land ownership of 20 
Bigha or more (see Figure 3 and Table 5). The unequal social status, power, and prestige 
of the Chowdhury families are closely associated to land ownership, though a 
considerable number of Chowdhury families do not own any farmland. Of the Muslim 
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General households, 28 percent are landless and another 19 percent have less than five 
Bigha of farmland. The landlord Chowdhury families, those who have 20 Bigha or more, 
represent 25 percent of the population, indicating that most of the Muslim General 
households cannot depend on their farm-based earnings. Inequality in terms of land 
ownership is visible not only between Muslim General and Muslim OBC households 
but also among the Muslim General households. On the other hand, among the Muslim 
OBC households surveyed, none own any land (Figure 3, Table 5).  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Muslim Households by Land Ownership and Social Category, 
Salai, Uttar Pradesh 
 
Sources: Field surveys 2012–2013, 2014–2015 
 
These households depend both on agriculture labors on the farmlands of the 
Chowdhury families, as well as on self-employed and casual labor in other sectors. A 
wide variety of income-generating activities, mostly in unorganized and informal 
sectors is noticeable among those who engage in non-farming employment sectors 
including: daily wage laborers, construction workers, electricians, mechanics, tailors, 
cloth vendors, buffalo-milk sellers and traders, masons, handicraft makers, small traders, 
Landless
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0% 
0% 
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27% 
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20% 
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drivers, and hair cutters, among others. 
The distribution of the households by principal occupation resembles the 
hierarchical difference between Muslim General and Muslim OBC families. As shown 
in Figure 4, 65 percent of Muslim OBC families have a non-farming principal 
occupation, including self-employed people but excluding day laborers and artisans, 
whereas 39 percent of Muslim General families depend on this source of employment. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Muslim Households by Principal Occupation and Social 
Category, Salai, Uttar Pradesh 
 
Sources: Field surveys 2012–2013, 2014–2015 
 
The difference in occupational trends between these two social groups is 
correlated with several other factors such as economy and education. This is also 
reflected in terms of the number of households with regular salaried jobs. None of the 
Muslim OBC households identify regular salaried jobs as their principal occupation, 
whereas six percent of Muslim General households have salaried jobs, though work in 
the private sector. The overall representation of Muslims in regular salaried jobs is 
negligible, at three percent. Muslim General families also have a greater percentage of 
workers in artisanal occupations than the Muslim OBC families, whose limited access 
to economic and social networks, particularly beyond the village, constrains their 
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opportunity for training in artisan work (see Figure 4). 
The educational aspirations, employment directions, physical mobility, social 
networks, and cultural capital of many Muslim youths are impacted by the caste 
hierarchy and land ownership issues. The cumulative effect of all these factors is the 
reproduction of differences between Muslim General and Muslim OBC families in 
everyday life, and this social and economic inequality persistently impedes the 
transformations of the lives of the Muslim OBCs. These forces are also applicable to the 
Muslim General households, who have a higher social status in the caste hierarchy but 
face economic constraints similar to those of the Muslim OBCs. 
 In addition to the agricultural economy, handcrafted moti (plastic pearl or bead) 
jewelry products are an important source of cash income for both landowning and 
landless families in the village. More than one-third of the families in the village, either 
directly or indirectly, experience economic benefits from this handicraft work. However, 
some Chowdhury families have a monopoly on this sector and many other families, 
especially the landless, depend on the wages from the labor supplied to them by the 
handicraft producers known as karigors (makers) from Chowdhury families. Rois 
Ahmad Chowdhury was credited with introducing this work into the village 17 years 
ago. Previously, he supplied buffalo milk from the village to the city, collecting it from 
the villagers and delivering it to residents and milk sellers in Delhi. One day he found 
that a family to whom he used to supply milk was involved in crafting moti jewelry. He 
was given some materials to make certain types of moti jewelry, and he began to take on 
this laborious work as a means of earning extra cash. Gradually, his work orders 
increased, forcing him to depend on others for help. He supplied the materials to 
different families, whom he paid when they completed their products. Now Rois Ahmad 
is one of the leading karigors of moti jewelry in the village. 
In accordance with India’s economic globalization, moti jewelry is in increasing 
demand in several European and American countries, Japan, and the United Arab 
Emirates. The moti jewelry sellers, mostly in Delhi and Noida, hunt for global buyers, 
and once they have received orders for certain products, they ask some local suppliers to 
deliver the products within a certain period of time. Suppliers usually collect the raw 
materials and provide them to the karigors in the village. Then the karigors distribute 
the raw materials to several families, especially targeting the female members of the 
family, and ask them to craft the products in a given number of days. Once the products 
are ready, the families bring them to the karigors, who check them for quality before 
packaging and supplying them to the people from whom the orders had been received. 
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The suppliers then confirm that the finishing and quality of the work conforms to the 
standards requested, before presenting the jewelry to the sellers, who handle the orders 
from foreign buyers. Usually, the sellers pay the suppliers after they receive payments 
from the foreign buyers, the suppliers then pay the karigors, and finally the karigors 
pay the families in the village. 
Following Rois Ahmad, Mustafa Tyagi, a landlord of the Chowdhury family, 
was also credited with bringing moti jewelry business into the village. When working as 
a tailor about 15 years ago in Delhi, Mustafa came to know some moti jewelry suppliers 
there. He found that engaging with the jewelry supply business would be more 
promising economically than his tailoring job. He returned to Salai with orders he had 
received from the suppliers in Delhi. Over time, he was able to expand his moti 
craftmaking work in the village. According to Mustafa, his jewelry products are crafted 
by nearly 300 families in Salai, and the wages of the family members who perform this 
work total 500,000 rupees annually. Now there are at least 20 jewelry producer families, 
mostly from the Chowdhury group, in the village who receive orders of various 
amounts from the suppliers and merchants of Delhi. 
 This access to income through jewelry crafting has transformed the relationship 
between education and employment in many ways. First, the income helps many 
families to send their children to fee-based community schools and colleges, although 
this phenomenon is somewhat gender-based. Second, it does not challenge the cultural 
construction of women in relation to their domestic world; that is, a gendered 
workspace is reproduced in which females in a household—those attending school 
regularly or irregularly as well as dropouts—engage in moti crafting work at home in 
addition to their daily household chores. Muslim girls do not need to leave their home, 
let alone their community, for this work. The boundary of work and home is consistent 
with the boundary of womanhood as culturally and religiously defined among Muslim 
communities in Salai. 
 
 
6 Changes in Educational Attainments and Schooling Types in Salai 
 
Educational opportunities inside the village have contributed to increasing educational 
attainment among the Muslims in Salai. In the late 1990s, the government established 
one primary school and one junior secondary high school in the village. Moreover, some 
villagers established two other secondary schools several years previously. The newly 
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established schools increased the Salai children’s opportunity to receive an education 
within their village up to the secondary level or grade 10.  
 
Table 6: Educational Institutions in Salai Village by Year of Founding, Type, Level, and 
Number of Students 
Educational Institutions Founded Type Level Students 
Primary School Salai 1997 Govt. Primary 161 
Purbo Madhyamik School 1998 Govt. Jr. Secondary 
(Grade 8) 
85 
Madrasa Jadid Higher 
Secondary School 
2007 Registered 
as madrasa 
Secondary (Grade 
10) 
433 
Madrasa Jamia Arabia 
Babul Islam 
1932 Registered*  Primary and 
Islamic education 
1118 
Maulana Abul Kalama 
Azad School 
2009 Registered 
as madrasa 
Secondary (Grade 
10) 
440 
Note: *Registered in Basic Sikhsa Adhikary (BSA, Basic Education Department) in 1935. 
Source: Field surveys 2012–2013, 2014–2015 
 
As shown in Table 6, there was only one educational institution—Madrasa Jamia 
Arabia Babul Islam, founded locally in 1932—in the village until the late 1990s. The 
lack of schooling opportunities in many Muslim villages is one of the significant causes 
of Muslims’ inferior educational attainment. This fact is supported by a government 
report that found that the student-teacher ratio in Muslim localities to be higher than in 
other areas and that Muslim communities have relatively few schools beyond the 
primary level (GOI, 2006, p. 16). 
 For more than six decades, from the early 1930s to the late 1990s, the Muslim 
community in Salai had to depend solely on Madrasa Jamia Babul Islam (hereafter 
MJBI) not just to learn Urdu and Arabic in order to maintain and preserve their religious 
and cultural distinctiveness, but also for basic general and non-religious courses. Like 
many other madrasas at both the lower and higher educational levels, the MJBI follows 
the tradition of Daurl Uloom Deoband, a famous private madrasa founded in 1866 in 
Deoband, Uttar Pradesh during the British colonial period and now the model for a 
leading school of thought concerning madrasa education in South Asia. The MJBI has 
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four sections of schooling: the pre-primary level for three years, primary for five years, 
a section for memorizing the Quran, and a section for advanced Islamic studies for girls. 
The number of students studying at MJBI is higher than at other educational institutions 
because many children maintain a double shift for their schooling; they attend the pre-
primary section of the madrasa for basic Islamic lessons in the early morning before go 
to formal schools in the village. The number of students in the Quran memorizing 
section, known as the Hifz course, is 80. The primary section focuses on basic Islamic 
lessons, Urdu, Arabic reading ability, Hindi, and some non-religious lessons such as 
arithmetic. The advanced Islamic studies section for girls, known as Jameyatul Taherat 
(Jamia means university; taherat comes from tahera, meaning “pure” and “chaste”; and 
aurat means women) was introduced in 2006. This section of the madrasa provides 
education for female dropouts and those who awaiting marriage. Of the 36 students in 
this section, many dropped out during or before reaching the secondary level; spending 
several hours a day on Islamic lessons enhances their marriage prospects. Being the 
oldest and first educational institution in the village, MJAB has a significant influence 
on educational trends among Muslims in Salai. However, that influence has been 
reduced due to the availability of government schools and a hybrid madrasa-school, 
which shall be discussed later. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of Children (age 5–14) by Level of Educational Attainment and 
Social Category 
Total 
Children 
Not Attend 
School 
Primary 
School 
Primary 
Madrasa 
Middle 
School 
Secondary 
School 
Dropout 
Muslim General 
87 10 33 32 10 2 2 
100% 11.49% 37.93% 36.78% 11.49% 2.30% 2.30% 
Muslim OBC 
93 7 40 32 14 0 5 
100% 7.53% 43.01% 34.41% 15.05% 0% 5.38% 
All Muslim Youths 
180 17 73 64 24 2 7 
100% 9.44% 40.56% 35.56% 13.33% 1.11% 3.89% 
Source: Field surveys 2012–2013, 2014–2015 
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The caste hierarchy and access to economic resources such as land ownership 
affects the differences in educational attainment between Muslim General and Muslim 
OBC families in the village. Among the children of Muslim OBC families age 5–14, the 
dropout rate is three percent higher than for the Muslim General families, although, 
ironically, 11.49 percent of Muslim General children have never attended school, 
compared to 7.53 percent in Muslim OBC families. The data from both social categories 
indicate that Muslim children tend to participate in primary and secondary education; 
however, a difference in the type of schooling is observed since a considerable number 
of Muslim children (more than 35 percent) participate in madrasas at the primary level. 
The overall attendance and participation of Muslim children at the primary and 
secondary levels give evidence that they are inclined to attend school at least up to the 
secondary level (see Table 7).  
 
Table 8: Distribution of Youths (age 15–29) by Level of Educational Attainment and 
Social Category 
Total 
Youths 
Illiterate* Primary 
School 
Primary 
Madrasa 
Middle 
School 
Secondary 
School 
Postsecondary 
Muslim General 
119 20 6 16 17 47 13 
100% 16.80 5.04% 13.45% 14.29% 39.50% 10.92% 
Muslim OBC 
77 27 7 15 14 11 3 
100% 35.06% 9.09% 19.48% 18.18% 14.29% 3.9% 
All Muslim Youths 
196 47 13 31 31 58 16 
100% 23.98% 6.63% 15.82% 15.82% 29.59% 8.16% 
Note: *Among the youths in this category, a few can read the Quran only. 
Source: Field surveys 2012–2013, 2014–2015 
 
In contrast, the difference in educational attainment by social category is more 
visible in later years. As shown in Table 8, more than 35 percent of Muslim OBC youths 
aged 15–29 are illiterate, twice the 16.8 percentage of Muslim General youths. The 
disparities of social hierarchy, economic opportunity, social networks, and cultural 
capital increase at the upper levels of education. The youths of Muslim OBC families 
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lag far behind in terms of aspirations and motivation to pursue higher education. Of the 
OBC youths, only 14.29 percent aspire to continue their study at the secondary school 
level, whereas 39.5 percent of Muslim General youths pursue their education at least 
until the secondary level. On the other hand, participation by Muslim OBC youths in 
post-secondary education is seven percent lower than that of Muslim General youths. 
However, the overall aspirations of Muslims for postsecondary education remain quite 
low, at only about 16 percent (see Table 8). These lesser aspirations for postsecondary 
education create a structural constraint for many Muslim youths, compelling them to 
become associated with certain informal, unorganized and self-employed sectors, 
creating a form of “minority enclave labor markets” (Das, 2008). 
 Despite the generally lower level of schooling among the Muslims, two major 
educational and social changes in Salai village were observed: first, resistance to the 
traditional system of madrasa education by a group of Muslims, mostly from 
Chowdhury families, who aimed to combine the educational content of madrasa and 
secular schools in order to accommodate both modern and Islamic educational needs; 
and second, the fact that greater educational opportunities inside the village were 
increasing school attendance among Muslim girls, who were not encouraged to cross 
the boundary of their community out of fear for their safety and social honor. 
 
6.1 Distancing from Religious Schools and the Low-Fee Hybrid Madrasa-School 
A reform initiative in education is evident in the Salai village. This initiative is tending 
to support change away from exclusively religious education for Muslims. The power of 
MJBI, the traditional madrasa in the village, and its education system were undermined 
when a group of Muslims split off from the madrasa management committee and 
founded Maulana Abul Kalam Azad School in 2009 so that they could teach more 
secular subjects. The school is a kind of entrepreneurial effort led by a Chowdhury 
family, and many believe that it has turned into a profit-making institution since the 
school charges tuition. Although this institution is called a school, its founders claim 
that it is a “modern madrasa,” because it includes both the general subject curriculum of 
secular schools and the religious curriculum of madrasas. Moreover, it has been 
recognized as a secondary madrasa by the Uttar Pradesh Madrasa Education Board in 
Lucknow. Being affiliated with the madrasa board, it was able to gain recognition as a 
minority educational institution and receive state incentives, such as teachers for non-
religious, general subject courses. However, the religious clerics of MJBI oppose this 
kind of schooling, especially the practice of co-education and the combined curriculum 
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system. Similarly, Madrasa Jadid Higher Secondary School is also a hybrid educational 
institution, as its name suggests, that has incorporated both madrasa and secular 
education. This hybrid type of private educational institution, despite its tuition fees, 
attracts those parents who want their children to receive both a general and a religious 
education. These institutions are inclusive in nature because they accept non-Muslim 
students and teachers. Compared to the traditional madrasa students, children studying 
in this hybrid madrasa-school can move into mainstream public educational institutions 
with less difficulty because their education is recognized and they have more training in 
general subject courses. Participation in these fee-based (at a cost of 50 to 250 rupees, 
depending on the level of education) community schools indicates that Muslim school 
attendance is strongly correlated with the breadth of available schooling opportunities in 
the village (see Table 8).  
 
6.2 An Increasing Trend toward Girls’ Education 
Scholars have found that gender-based fear of the public is one of the most important 
factors restricting Muslim girls’ access to higher education outside their community. For 
many Muslim girls, the boundaries of home and community delimit the only “safe space” 
able to protect them from the risks of physical or sexual abuse and assault on both their 
cultural and religious identity (GOI, 2006, p. 13). Since the space outside the 
neighborhood is perceived as unfriendly and unsafe for girls, the discourse of social 
honor, ratified in certain cultural norms and religious traditions, continues to have a 
negative effect on Muslim girls’ ability to pursue schooling outside their own 
community. Furthermore, girls are viewed as less important economic agents in terms of 
their contribution to family welfare. This norm prevails across all religious groups in 
rural India. In this context, education opportunities for Muslim girls depend largely on 
the school facilities available to them in their own community.  
As discussed earlier, the madrasa was the only educational institution in Salai 
until the late 1990s. Since attending school outside the village was, and remains a rare 
phenomenon, the Muslim girls had to depend on the madrasa as their source of 
education, which was mostly of a primary educational level. The establishment of 
hybrid madrasa-schools inside the village expanded the opportunity for girls to attend 
school at least through grade 10, whereas previously they were limited to junior 
secondary school (through grade eight). After graduation from the village schools, 
daughters of some Muslim families enrolled in higher secondary public schools and 
colleges in the Hapur city area, but usually not as regular students. To avoid having to 
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commute from the village to the city, many of them are admitted as “private students,” 
meaning that they can show up to take the course exam without having attended classes 
on a regular basis. This enrollment on paper without actually attending courses offers a 
flexible educational option for Muslim girls whose families do not want them to leave 
their community regularly due to safety, cultural, and religious concerns. They can 
continue to do household chores and fulfill other domestic roles with their mothers, and 
if they are sufficiently prepared, can appear at the public examination of the college 
course in which they listed as students. 
 
 
7 Linkages of Education and Employment: Muslim Youths’ Strategies  
 
Multiple factors, including the caste hierarchy, economic resources, extended kinship 
relations through biradari system, and exposure and connections to the wider social 
world beyond their community, impact the means by which Muslim youths of Salai 
village link (or fail to link) their educational credentials to career opportunities. Family 
economic burdens create heavy responsibilities for many of these youths at an early age. 
Many families are large—the 70 surveyed households had an average of nearly eight 
family members—and the resulting economic demands limit youths’ ability to pursue 
higher education and push them into seeking income-generating activities at earlier 
stages of their lives. Generally, the village families have not been reached by the 
government’s family planning program and are unaware of the economic benefits of 
contraception and birth control. Ironically, for the Muslim parents that interviewed by 
the author, having more children translates into greater economic security because the 
more children, especially boys, these parents had, the more earnings they can expect to 
generate in the future. But when they have a large number of children, parents cannot 
provide unlimited education opportunities to all their children, and in a majority of these 
cases, the girls are less privileged when being permitted to pursue higher education. The 
gender disparity in education, therefore, begins in the family, as girls are not seen as 
economic agents who can contribute to the family’s welfare. This factor is inextricably 
associated with the economic burden that parents must bear in the form of providing a 
dowry for their daughters’ marriages. The provision of a dowry is not just a gendered 
custom, but a matter of social prestige for every family; it is widely practiced across 
various Muslim occupational and Hindu caste groups. Although school attendance by 
Muslim girls has increased due to the availability of several educational institutions in 
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the village, the girls are seldom encouraged to continue their studies beyond what is 
available in the village. For some families, the presence of the young women at home 
does increase family income, because the girls can engage in jewelry making.  
The negative perceptions of education as a career-enhancing factor result partly 
from the reservation system and partly from the uncertain job market in an unequal 
social context characterized by unbalanced competition, as reflected in the following 
assertions offered in one interview during fieldwork: 
 
“The reservation system should exist only in education, not in the employment 
sector. The Muslim population here in our village is predominant, but they are 
economically impoverished. When the Muslims continue their education, they 
need to engage in some kind of work at the same time. Because of this double 
burden, they cannot progress properly in their studies. In our society, the SCs, 
who are given a 22 percent reservation quota, have a better life than us. They 
get benefits in education. For example, their students with lower grades can get 
admitted into good educational institutions. Our marks are higher than theirs, 
but we cannot get admitted into these institutions. We are treated as in the 
general category. They get benefits in jobs also. For example, we need grades 
of 80 percent to get a job; they can get the same job with only 60 percent. 
There are a few OBCs such as Teli, Nai, etc. in our village. They represent the 
backward Muslims. OBCs get a 27 percent quota, but they are so diverse that 
you cannot count them… For example, if there is a recruitment announcement 
for 100 positions, we actually compete for 30. Of the 100 positions, 49 are 
reserved (22 for SCs and STs and 27 for OBCs). Of the remaining 51 positions, 
some are reserved for women and some are for departmental officials. 
Therefore, nearly 70 seats are reserved, and we compete as general candidates 
for only the remaining 30 positions.”2 
 
This sort of contention is expressed mostly by the Chowdhury occupational 
groups, who represent the predominant population of the village. Other Muslim groups 
such as Teli, Nai, Saqqa, Fakir, etc. fall into the OBC category, which represents 40.7 
percent of the total Muslim population in India (Khanam, 2013, p. 7); these groups 
cannot usually take advantage of the benefits of the reservation system because typically 
2 Recorded interview with Naushad Chowdhury, December 31, 2014, Salai, Hapur. 
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their children drop out of school during, or even before, reaching the secondary 
education level, and begin doing paid work to help with their family’s economic needs. 
Even those who were pursuing post-secondary education feel greater uncertainty 
about their job futures. The quality of education that they receive, mostly from 
inexpensive government institutions, cannot equip them to compete with the graduates 
of private English-medium schools. The higher social classes always prefer to send their 
children to English-medium schools because of their superior educational quality: 
 
“The children of rich families go to Delhi Public School. They do not send their 
children to government school. The students coming here are mostly from poor 
families. Children of government officials, doctors, engineers, and even Pradhan 
do not come to government schools. So there is no social equality. If there were 
equality, the higher-class people would have sent their children to government 
schools, but they do not. I have not seen children from Pradhan’s family coming 
to this school for many years.”3 
 
After secondary education, students wishing to continue their studies must enroll 
at an educational institution in the city. As a regular student, commuting from village to 
city for educational purposes requires money. Since these families generally have a 
large number of children, not all of them pursue education beyond the village. Some 
continue as regular students and others as private students. As noted above, the status of 
private student gives Muslim youths the chance to engage in other income-generating 
activities, since they do not need to attend the college on a regular basis. During my 
fieldwork, the author found that a considerable number of Muslim youths pursued 
education as private students after completing grade 12. Private student status is the 
beginning of becoming disconnected from education, however, since the students spend 
most of their time on activities other than studying. 
 
7.1 The Gendered Boundary of Education and Work 
Mahol (also spelled as mahal, literally meaning “place of residence”), is term used by 
the villagers to refer to the outer world and wider society; one seen as unsafe for 
Muslim girls. The defined and permitted boundary for Muslim girls, for either education 
or work, is the inner world, the home and the community. After completing the 
3 Interview with Maulana Abdul Jalil, teacher, Purbo Madhyamik School, Salai. 
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education available to them in the village, Muslim girls need to go elsewhere if they 
want to partake in further study. But in many cases, their families are not willing to send 
them outside the village for fear of bodnami (disrepute or dishonor). To them, sending 
grown-up Muslim girls to study in the city is risky in two senses. First, the girls would 
have the opportunity to mingle with boys, adapt certain nontraditional lifestyles, and 
participate in illicit relationships and affairs that would undermine their cultural 
tradition and the parents’ authority over them; second, they could be subjected to sexual 
and other forms of abuse in a vulnerable social context in which the safety of girls of all 
classes and communities is still a serious concern. The “danger of disrepute” has been a 
powerful discourse in defining the boundary of education for Muslim girls in rural India 
(Jeffery et al., 2005, p. 110). 
 The notion of disrepute is intricately correlated with the economic condition of 
the Muslim families. As discussed earlier, Muslim families tend to have a relatively high 
number of children, creating huge economic pressure to meet their family’s daily needs. 
In this context, they cannot place great importance on their girls’ education. After 
attaining a certain level of schooling, many Muslim girls have found that home-based 
moti handicraft work gives them the opportunity to earn money rather than attending 
college in the city. Very few families had daughters pursuing postsecondary education 
by commuting to the city on a regular basis. Instead, most of them were admitted to 
government colleges as private students, allowing them to generate income at home 
through moti jewelry making and thereby contribute to the household economy. During 
my fieldwork, the astir encountered several Muslim girls who were making moti jewelry 
products even though they had acquired postsecondary degrees. Despite their higher 
level of educational credentials, their working space is defined in association with the 
Muslin notion of home. Pursuing a career outside home and the village community is 
perceived as uncommon. Higher education and career aspirations, particularly outside 
the community space, may have a negative influence on a young woman’s marriage 
prospects. The gendered boundary of education and work, therefore, largely explains the 
lack of expansion of young Muslim females’ career opportunities.  
 
7.2 Study and Work Strategies 
Within this study, several cases of Muslim youths who needed to undertake the double 
burden of earning income while pursuing their education were examined. In addition to 
studying, these youths were also involved in family farming or in various non-farming 
jobs, ranging from selling buffalo milk to small-scale trading and business activities in 
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the village and neighboring localities. 
 Naushad, a 24-year-old Muslim from a Chowdhury family with six siblings, 
recently completed his M.A. as a private student. His family’s farmlands could not meet 
their economic needs, so he had to engage in other income-generating activities as well. 
His father, whom he helps on the farm, also makes and trades sanitary toilet materials to 
generate additional income. During his M.A. studies, Naushad developed a small-scale 
textbook trading business in Salai and the neighboring villages. Since he was not a 
regular M.A. student, he could spend time on this business, which he operated from 
June to September. He could manage the amount of money needed for the business from 
various sources including the “Committee”4, informal savings, and a rotating credit 
system among a group of members in the village. He buys textbooks, of the nursery 
level to grade eight, from wholesale markets in the city of Meerut. He then holds the 
books in a small storage room and solicits orders from schools and bookshops. Naushad 
can earn 10–20 percent profit from his sales. He returns the remaining books to the 
wholesale seller in Meerut city. He can earn 100,000 rupees each year from the textbook 
business, helping to cover his own tuition and exam fees and also support his family. 
Currently, he is looking for a government job, though he is not confident about his 
chances since as a general candidate he is not eligible for the reservation system. 
Because of this uncertainty, he alternatively planned to develop his textbook business 
further if he could not secure any other job. Naushad said that although his business 
functioned for only three months, he can remain engaged in it all year if he expanded 
his business to other states. 
 Like Naushad, many Muslim youths engage in income-generating work while 
also pursuing education. They work in city jobs such as at call centers in Noida, and 
many discontinue their education when their jobs turn into a profession, although some 
return to school after working for a period of time. For instance, Kamrar Alam, a 20-
year-old Muslim from a Chowdhury family with 10 siblings, left school after grade 12 
when his father became sick. His family could not depend on the earnings from their 
farmlands for subsistence. The father had been earning additional income through a 
handicraft business and so, when he was unable to work due to sickness, Kamrar 
4 The “Committee,” a kind of cooperative system of saving and borrowing money built upon 
understanding, social relations, and trust among a group of members, is a common practice in 
rural India. In Salai, many youths and small-scale businessmen participated in such a group. The 
members select the head of the group and deposit a certain amount of money on a particular 
date each month. Money from these deposits is given as loans to members in need. The 
committee is thus the organization handling the flow of money.  
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abandoned his plans to study hotel management. His elder brother, who had been 
admitted to a bachelor’s degree program in business administration at a college in 
Meerut city, was also compelled to discontinue his education. Kamrar gradually took 
over the responsibility for his father’s handicraft work and had been managing it for 
three years when the author first met him. Kamrar subsequently stopped working for the 
handicraft business due to the irregular payments received from suppliers, but his elder 
brother took over the responsibility of the business. Later, he and one of his friends 
established a clothing shop in the city but suffered financial losses. Recently Kamrar has 
resumed his educational career, and is planning to take the higher secondary public 
exam in biology, which would help him to pursue employment in the pharmaceutical 
sector. If he is successful on the biology exam, he plans to get a bachelor’s degree in 
Pharmacy (known as a B. Pharma) from a private college in Ghaziabad district, 
although the cost is very high at 100,000 rupees per year. If he could get a B. Pharma 
degree, Kamrar would apply for employment at medical and pharmaceutical companies. 
Alternatively, since B. Pharma degree holders are eligible for pharmaceutical licenses 
for two medical stores, he could establish medical stores or rent the licenses to others 
for use in their own stores.  
 
7.3 Biradari Networks and Internship Strategy  
In their search for career opportunities, many Muslim youths, after completing their 
secondary education, use their kinship and social networks to find a practical internship 
in the technical and mechanical employment sectors. Internships are an informal way to 
acquire technical skills in the construction, electrical, and mechanical sectors. For this 
type of job, the youths need to move outside their locality and spend months or years 
learning the trade. Once they have been trained by their ustad or “master”, they can 
obtain salaried jobs within their specialized, mostly unorganized, employment sectors 
through informal networks. Opportunities for such work are limited in Hapur city, a 
small district town, but ample in Noida, a growing city adjacent to Delhi with huge 
construction work and considerable urban facilities, including offices of large 
companies and residences of elite businessmen and white-collar employees. Many 
Muslim youths who have acquired some skills in construction, technical, and 
mechanical careers have found Noida to be a good place for employment opportunities 
and small-scale business ventures. The following cases illustrate their typical career 
paths, which they may begin to pursue after or before completing their secondary 
education through internships and by utilizing kinship relations and social networks, 
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mostly within the biradari system. 
 Nadeem Ahmad left school at age 16. He completed grade eight at the junior 
high school in Salai village but could pursue further studies because his family wanted 
him to get some kind of paying job. Through his family connection with a person in the 
village, who had a battery repair and sales shop in Hapur city, he started to work at the 
shop as an intern, staying there for two years. During the internship, he received a small 
amount of pocket money, paid on an irregular basis, but no regular salary from his 
master, the shop owner. After two years, once he had acquired the necessary skills, he 
began receiving a salary of 4,000 rupees per month. Later, he decided to leave this job 
in Hapur and move to Noida. To him, Noida is a big city with better career opportunities. 
First, he went to one of his relatives in Noida, who introduced him to electric generator 
repair business for work. Nadeem worked as an intern there for seven months. During 
his internship, he again did not earn much money, but he had no difficulty because he 
stayed with his parental uncle, who was living in a rented room. The uncle covered all 
his necessary costs, including food. Later, he started to work in a battery shop owned by 
another paternal uncle in Noida. After one year he moved on to a different shop, owned 
by yet another uncle, where he could earn 7,000 rupees a month. After working for five 
years in the shop, he was then able to establish his own business, which he did. He 
frequently returns to his village and provides economic support to his family. 
 Chowdhury Zeshan, who was 22 years old when the author spoke with him, had 
established an air conditioner repair shop in Noida three years earlier. He left high 
school at age 14 and worked as an intern in a tailor shop in Salai. After he had been 
there for nearly one year, his cousin brought him to Noida and introduced him to a 
boutique tailor shop where he could earn 6,000 rupees a month. Later, he moved to 
another tailoring business and worked there for one and a half years. Although a skilled 
tailor, he was interested in repairing air conditioners, an occupation that he had found to 
be in demand amidst Noida’s increasingly urbanized lifestyle. Thus, he started to work 
as an intern at an air conditioner repair shop, finally establishing his own shop. To start 
such a shop, he explained, required a tool box, a bike, oxygen materials, and rented 
business space. There are four interns working in his shop and one karigor (a mechanic 
or maker). The business’s peak season lasts from March–August, India’s summer season. 
During this time, his shop receives many repair orders; during the winter, he and his 
staff repair geyser machines. Washing machine and refrigerator repairs continue all year. 
During the peak season, he can earn 400,000 to 500,000 rupees which enable him to 
contribute support for his family. Now he is planning to establish another shop in Noida. 
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7.4 Disparity Within: Muslim Youths, Social Networks, and Cultural Capital 
There are identifiable differences in employment patterns between the two social 
categories of Muslim youths, namely the Muslim General and the Muslim OBCs. As 
discussed above, most of the youths who engage in self-employment or other 
employment sectors beyond the village community come from the Muslim General 
families. Why are the Muslim OBC youths less represented in employment outside the 
village? This pattern may be interconnected with the greater connectivity skills of the 
Muslim youths from Chowdhury families, some of whom are privileged in terms of 
land ownership and higher social status when compared to the landless Muslim OBC 
families. This connectivity, expressed through the youths’ cultural interactions and 
lifestyle strategies, provides them with an extra advantage in acquiring exposure to the 
wider social world, particularly urban life; youths of Muslim OBC families often lack 
this feature, reflecting a clear difference in social networks and cultural capital. 
Bourdieu (1974, 1977) contended that the reproduction of social status and hierarchy 
was not merely dependent on educational credentials, but also on the mastery of social 
networks and certain cultural capital (see also Sullivan, 2002). The youths of 
Chowdhury landowner families illustrate Bourdieu’s claim. With their secondary and 
sometimes postsecondary educational attainment, they are able to connect themselves to 
the wider social world beyond their community, whereas the social world of many 
youths from landless families is limited to their community, or else to Hapur city, if they 
are unsupported by kinship groups from other areas. 
The superior cultural capital of youths from Muslim General families, 
particularly the landlord families, is manifested and articulated in several visible 
lifestyle aspects. Wearing jeans and other urban and Western-style attire and riding 
motorbikes, these “educated youths” hang out with their friends and often spend time 
outside the village. Their wider physical mobility is often translated into economic 
activities when coming up with certain ideas such as joint venture or partnership 
businesses, resuming their studies with a defined specialized or technical career goal in 
mind. In contrast, the OBC youths, constrained by multiple factors including family 
economic burdens, are usually compelled to take on casual labor and other low-paying 
non-farming jobs, regardless of their level of educational attainment. During the 
fieldwork conducted in Noida, the author observed that the Chowdhury youths 
dominated the small-scale businesses and mechanical- or technical-related shops, where 
OBC youths’ ownership or participation was virtually nonexistent. However, youths of 
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economically impoverished families from both the Muslim General and OBC classes 
are found in Noida, where they perform low-paying manual labor roles.  
 
Table 9: Distribution of Youths (Age 15–29) by Schooling, Employment, and Social 
Category, Salai, Uttar Pradesh 
Total Youths Studying Working Type of Work 
Farming Non-Farming Regular Jobs 
Muslim General 
119 61 58 8 50 0 
100% 51.26% 48.74% 13.79% 86.21% 0% 
Muslim OBC 
77 10 67 0 67 0 
100% 12.99% 87.01% 0% 100% 0% 
All Muslims 
196 71 125 8 117 0 
100% 36.22% 63.78% 6.4% 93.6% 0% 
Sources: Field surveys 2012–2013, 2014–2015 
 
As shown in Table 9, the differences between Muslim General and OBC youths 
are clearly visible, resulting from the disparity in economic resources and from the gap 
in social networking and cultural capital. The percentage of OBC youths aged 15–29 
who are involved primarily in work rather than studying, is very high, at 87 percent, 
whereas the ratio of workers to students among the Muslim General youths is very 
similar, at 49–51 percent. The far higher percentage of working youths among the OBC 
families indicates these families’ greater economic burdens. These burdens affect the 
youths’ social connectivity and physical mobility, whereas the General youths are 
relatively privileged in this regard. When one looks at specific types of employment, 
one finds that most of the self-employed youths come from landowning families. 
Though both groups predominantly work in non-farming jobs, the nature of these jobs 
can vary considerably in prestige, power, and status, consistent with the youths’ position 
within the Muslim social classes and caste group hierarchy. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
I shall close by briefly considering the wider relevance of this paper. The ethnographic 
empirical evidence presented here challenges three widely held popular and scholarly 
viewpoints, at different levels and degrees, among various stakeholders both inside and 
outside Indian society: (a) that Muslims are unwilling to adapt to the changes in India’s 
neoliberal education and development paradigms, primarily due to their religious and 
social conservatism; (b) that they tend to prefer madrasas (Islamic religious schools) 
rather than modern secular and national schools, as both a sign of resistance to the 
modern development paradigm as well as a means of differentiating and constructing 
themselves as a distinct cultural and religious group over and against the Hindu 
majority; and (c) that Muslims in India are a predominantly homogeneous group whose 
status quo can be described in a way that subsumes class and other social differences. 
First, the study reveals that community-initiated and reform-oriented schooling 
trends are accommodating modern secular forms of educational content, though not 
entirely ignoring culturally and religiously informed content, indicating that Muslims 
aspire to cope with and adapt to modern educational changes. Second, the Muslim 
community, even in the case of such a peripheral village like Salai, tends distance itself 
from the more traditional and orthodox system of Islamic education, suggesting that 
processes of social change are occurring despite the influence, power, and authority of 
the traditional Islamic religious schools. This distancing process has probably been 
pushed forward by India’s growing economic globalization and development paradigm, 
to which Muslims cannot be considered unresponsive. However, in this process of 
distancing from traditional forms of Islamic schooling, a new community-based, low-
fee, private schooling system has emerged as a form of educational entrepreneurship. 
On one hand, this new system increases the overall access to schools provided to 
Muslim children, but on the other hand, it also creates a group of rural elites, albeit a 
numerically small one; those who own and manage this entrepreneurial activity within 
the Muslim community. Third, with regard to social change, Muslims cannot be 
perceived as a homogeneous group, as evidenced by the cases that presented herein, for 
there are considerable differences within the Muslim community, particularly between 
the Muslim General and OBC categories.  
Finally, it has been shown that, despite for the changes in schooling options and 
increasing participation in education, some patterns of educational behaviors and 
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employment trends are markedly visible among Muslim youths. Many Muslim youths 
experience a situation of bewilderment both during and after their secondary education. 
Their transition period from school to work is frequently characterized by career 
uncertainties, as they increasingly feel that a certain degree of formal education is 
necessary but may not guarantee employment in regular salaried and other “respectable 
jobs.” They see themselves as the victims in an unbalanced comparison of educational 
and personal credentials between those groups who are socially, economically, and 
culturally privileged and those who are not. This difficulty leads a large number of 
Muslim youths withdrawing from secondary school, causing many of them, particularly 
those from the OBC group, to end up as casual workers. Therefore, despite certain 
changes in educational attainment and credentials, Muslims’ employment in India 
continues to be concentrated within particular unorganized and informal sectors, leading 
to their underrepresentation in regular white-collar and governmental jobs. 
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ANNEX 
Table 3: Distribution of Youth Population (age 17–29) by Educational Attainment for Each Socio-Religious Community in the 
Years 1999–2000 and 2009–2010 
         1999–2000 
 
Hindu 
UC 
Hindu 
OBC 
Hindu 
SC 
Hindu 
ST 
Muslim 
OBC 
Muslim 
General 
Muslim 
All 
Other 
Minorities All 
Illiterate 
 
13.4% 
 
33.7% 
 
42.9% 
 
53.1% 
 
33.7% 
 
36.9% 
 
36.0% 
 
18.8% 
 
30.9% 
 
Secondary and 
Below 
 
58.7% 
 
54.7% 
 
49.5% 
 
39.6% 
 
59% 
 
54.0% 
 
55.5% 
 
58.7% 
 
54% 
 
Higher Secondary 
 
15.9% 
 
8.0% 
 
5.3% 
 
5.8% 
 
5.3% 
 
6.0% 
 
5.8% 
 
14.6% 
 
9.5% 
 
Postsecondary 
 
12% 
 
3.6% 
 
2.3% 
 
1.5% 
 
2.1% 
 
3.1% 
 
2.7% 
 
8% 
 
5.5% 
 
All 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
2009–2010 
 
         Illiterate 
 
5.7% 
 
16.2% 
 
24.7% 
 
30.1% 
 
26.1% 
 
18.8% 
 
22.3% 
 
8.8% 
 
17.1% 
 
Secondary and 
Below 
 
51.2% 
 
59.3% 
 
60.8% 
 
58% 
 
59% 
 
67.7% 
 
63.8% 
 
56.2% 
 
58.2% 
 
Higher Secondary 
 
24% 
 
16.1% 
 
10% 
 
8.6% 
 
10.2% 
 
9.7% 
 
9.8% 
 
22.1% 
 
15.5% 
 
Postsecondary 
 
19.2% 
 
8.5% 
 
4.5% 
 
3.3% 
 
4.8% 
 
3.8% 
 
4.1% 
 
13% 
 
9.2% 
 
All 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
 
         Note: UC refers to Upper Caste, OBC to Other Backward Classes, SC to Scheduled Castes, ST to Scheduled Tribes 
Source: Observer Research Foundation, India Datalabs (cf. Basant, 2012, p. 12) 
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